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An American Expert in the Pacific Age 
Victor Heiser was in charge of Rockefeller programs in Asia and the Pacific 
(which his contemporaries called the “Pacific region”) as Director for the East of 
the International Health Board (IHB) of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1915 to 
1934.1 The IHB provided a substantial portion (30–40 percent) of the funding for 
international health projects of the League of Nations Health Organization 
(LNHO, 1921–46), and also conducted its own programs in various parts of the 
world.2 In recent years, scholars have begun to see the League as an important 
harbinger of global norms in the following era of the United Nations, and the role 
of the LNHO is in particularly well acknowledged.3 Heiser oversaw a large part of 
the LNHO’s international health work in Asia and the Pacific.4 Compared to other 
Rockefeller IHB officers who worked in Asia, such as John B. Grant, Roger 
Greene, and Selskar Gunn, however, Heiser’s work as Director for the East, 
especially in the relations between the IHB and the League, has been relatively 
unknown. What kind of man was he, and what principles or philosophies for 
international health did he have? What role did he play in defining the nature of 
the IHB’s involvement in the LNHO work in Asia and the Pacific? 
 
As the IHB’s Director for the East, Heiser spent most of his term travelling 
around the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) 
houses the travel diaries he kept from 1925 to 1934, which are divided into the 
clusters 1925–26, 1927–29, 1930–31, and 1932–34.5 In this paper, I focus on the 
years 1925–26, a key period of convergence among the LNHO, the IHB, and the 
Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine (FEATM, 1910–38).6  
 
One of the main objectives for my research at the RAC in 2014 was to see whether 
the FEATM played a role in connecting among colonial experts and 
administrations in Asia, the IHB, and the LNHO. This inquiry is a part of a larger 
project that examines the relationship between colonial health governance and 
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international health governance in Asia through the interactions of these 
organizations.7  
 
Although it turned out that little material on the FEATM exists at the RAC, by 
combining other sources at the RAC with sources from other archives and 
libraries, I pieced together the roles of experts at the FEATM (many of them 
worked for the colonial administrations in the region).8 I then wrote an article 
arguing that the LNHO adopted the practices and regional health agenda of the 
FEATM in 1923–25.9 The article demonstrates the significance of the FEATM 
network of colonial tropical medicine experts who were located in Asia. This 
significance lay in its role in reshaping the International Sanitary Convention 
(ISC), which was to constitute what we now call global health governing norms. 
The article also shows that the LNHO acted as a medium to channel the views of 
these FEATM experts to the discussions on the ISC unfolding in Geneva and 
Paris.10 The ISC had been formulated and revised by the International Sanitary 
Conferences (1851–1938). The years 1923–26 were an intense period of debates 
that led to the revision of the ISC in 1926.  
 
Meanwhile, in Asia in the 1910s and 1920s, the FEATM became an epistemic 
community of public health experts in the region: here I am using Haas’s idea of 
an epistemic community where experts discussed ideas and they brought back 
these ideas to influence public and policy debates in their own countries.11 My 
article shows that the FEATM network’s region-wide public health agenda had 
two major aspects, and that the LNHO adopted one of them in 1923–25. It also 
argues that this expert network and its agendas were best characterized as 
intercolonial, as opposed to international, and that by adopting one of the 
FEATM’s main agendas, namely a region-wide standard quarantine system in 
Asia, the LNHO incorporated intercolonialism as a layer of its internationalism.12  
This article focuses on Heiser’s role not as an IHB officer, but mainly as a 
determined colonial public health administrator from the American Philippines 
who was a driving force for the FEATM in its initial period. Since 1910, Heiser 
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had pushed for the “other” main element of the FEATM’s regional public health 
agenda, a region-wide, intergovernmental anti-beriberi campaign. This agenda 
did not gain unanimous support at the FEATM, nor was it adopted by the LNHO. 
In this paper, I locate Heiser as the IHB’s Director for the East in a context in 
which the FEATM and the LNHO were intersecting. By the mid-1920s, he had 
left his colonial post for more than a decade, although he was still very much 
involved in Philippine high politics. I suggest here that his diary of 1925–26 
shows Heiser as an important point for an intercolonial transfer of knowledge on 
public health administration among experts in colonial governments, the LNHO, 
the IHB, and the FEATM. He was also, I further submit, a key figure in 
integrating IHB officers on the ground into colonial and intercolonial public 
health infrastructures in the region. I also suggest that he was a forerunner of the 
American experts who contributed to the shaping of regional governing agenda 
by what I call pan-Pacific organizations in the 1920s and 1930s, and in the era 
that has been often characterized as the period of US isolationism.13  
Heiser before the IHB 
Heiser was born in 1873 in Johnstown, Pennsylvania and passed away in 
Brooklyn, New York in 1972 at the age of 100. As his well-known memoir 
describes, he narrowly escaped death at the time of the massive Johnstown flood 
of 1889.14 The New York Community Trust his life on its website: 
Heiser, at the age of sixteen the sole family survivor of the 
Johnstown flood of 1889, was no stranger to challenges: He 
worked as a plumber and carpenter, and then put himself through 
college and medical school. But after graduating from medical 
school, he wanted to prevent disease rather than simply treat it. 
For three decades he did just that, in Italy, Egypt, the Philippines, 
Ceylon, Java, Ethiopia, Thailand, and Japan. He had some 
spectacular successes in the Philippines where his efforts helped 
attract young women into nursing at a time of desperate shortage, 
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improved sanitation, and virtually eradicated smallpox. But he was 
appalled by the way lepers were treated and frustrated by the 
failure to find a way to prevent and treat leprosy …. He died in 
1972 at the age of 100, and through his will established the Heiser 
Gift in the New York Community Trust to research the prevention 
and control of leprosy. It is one of only two funds in the world 
created to fight the disease.15 
 
Heiser’s experience of the horrific Johnstown disaster—watching many people 
perish, finding his mother’s body, and losing his father—must have deeply 
affected him. It probably created a man of drive and discipline, and most likely 
determined his professional trajectory. Heiser graduated from Jefferson Medical 
College in 1897 and sought a career in preventive medicine. He entered the US 
Public Health Service and rose to prominence. He was posted to the Philippines, 
first as chief quarantine officer, then became Director of the Bureau of Health at 
the Department of the Interior of the Government of the Philippine Islands, 
which position he held until he joined the IHB in 1915. 
  
This colonial post defined his subsequent career. The job, often referred to as 
Director of Heath, was more than “chief quarantine officer,”16 as he was in charge 
of the whole public health administration of the colony, and reshaped the islands’ 
public health system. 17  Warwick Anderson suggests that Heiser’s stress on 
military priorities defined the nature of his public health work in the American 
Philippines. It also defined his style of public health administration: he ran it like 
the military procedures.18  
 
As public health advisor to the Governor General of the Philippines, the post gave 
Heiser a crucial connection with high officials in the Philippines. It also opened a 
door for him to the top officials of the other imperial polities in Asia, giving him 
membership in an inner circle of colonial high officers in the region. His diary 
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demonstrates that this inner circle status was vital for his work for the IHB after 
1915. 
 
During his term in Manila, Heiser became a forerunner of the Americans who led 
a group of public health experts in the region in the late 1900s. The Far Eastern 
Medical Association was established in Manila shortly before 1908, leading to the 
formation of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine (FEATM) there in 
1908.19 Those who gathered for the first FEATM meeting in Manila that year were 
mainly colonial medical experts. The site of the meeting and the list of the 
participants indicated that experts from the American Philippines had initiated 
the move. Eleven came from the Philippines. Two each came from Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Siam and one each from China, the Federated Malay States, 
Japan, Ceylon, and French Indochina. Only three, including one Japanese, had 
non-European names.20 Although Heiser’s name does not appear on the list of 
attendees at the founding 1908 meeting of the FEATM, his leadership role in the 
organization would soon become evident. 
  
Heiser’s policy towards beriberi in the colony was as autocratic as his colonial 
public health policy in general. By 1910, Heiser had seen enough scientific 
evidence to be convinced that a staple diet of over-milled (white) rice was a major 
cause of beriberi, a deadly and prevalent disease in Asia. It was a serious problem 
in the Philippines, and as Director of Health, he had banned white rice at all 
public institutions, such as schools, prisons, hospitals, and public offices, shortly 
before the first FEATM conference in Manila in 1910. In his view, this was an 
obvious step. The measure, he believed, would serve two main objectives of the 
colonial government: good colonial governance and economic productivity. It 
would also serve a humanitarian concern. For Heiser, the ban on white rice 
would “save more human lives…. and at the same time be of greater economic 
advantage than any one health measure proposed in modern times.”21 Although 
such concerns were humanitarian as well managerial, the implementation was 
autocratic: there was little consideration for the rights, customs, or habits of 
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colonial subjects. The colony, Heiser wrote, was “a huge laboratory in which my 
collaborators and I could work out an ideal program.”22 There, he and his staff 
could try a radical experiment with little consideration of citizens, local 
opposition, or existing vested interests in the metropole. 
 
For Heiser, the FEATM was a site where an effective public health policy idea 
could be disseminated to the administrative units in the region. The FEATM held 
ten conferences throughout Southeast Asia between 1910 and 1938.23 At the first 
FEATM conference in Manila in 1910, Heiser proposed a region-wide 
intergovernmental anti-beriberi campaign, based on his policy in the Philippines. 
The proposal rested on solid evidence, he argued, that his radical measure in the 
Philippines was successfully reducing morbidity in Manila. As more local data 
strengthened this point, Heiser continued to advocate the agenda in the next two 
FEATM conferences, held in Hong Kong in 1912 and Saigon in 1913. The 
campaign became one of the two original FEATM’s regional governing agendas. 
The second was the standardization of quarantine practice in the region.24 
Heiser Becomes IHB Director for the East 
Heiser’s achievements as chief colonial public health administrator in the 
Philippines led the IHB to recruit him in 1915 as its Director for the East. 
Wickliffe Rose, the IHB’s first director (1913–23), met Heiser while travelling in 
the region. Having heard that Heiser was ready to move on, Rose created the 
position specifically for him. Heiser resigned from the Philippine administration 
in 1914, and joined the IHB the next year. Farley suggests that Heiser could be 
counted as one of “Rose-appointed misfits”,25 most likely because of Heiser’s 
unorthodox style of operations in Asia, to be detailed below. 
 
It is nonetheless easy to understand why Rose wanted to recruit him. Heiser 
shared a Rose’s conviction that the most important mission in the world—not 
only of the Rockefeller Foundation, but of the United States—was to assist in the 
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establishment of viable public health infrastructures and conduct effective public 
health education. 
 
During his term at the IHB, Heiser was a coordinator of IHB’s field offices in Asia 
and the Pacific, spending most of his time travelling the Pacific Ocean, far away 
from IHB headquarters in New York. Farley describes Heiser as “outspoken, 
tough, and opinionated” with a “considerable ego”, and he managed a great 
degree of discretion. Heiser “saw himself as the Potentate of the East”, and “ran 
his fiefdom with little control from New York” with “a fine eye for public 
relations.” He was a “robust, domineering, vigorous, suave man of the world, who 
enjoyed life to the full.”26 
 
How did Heiser transform himself from a colonial administrator to an 
international health officer at the IHB—or did he? How influential was he in 
defining IHB activities in the region, and what does his 1925–26 diary reveal 
about the role he played in various colonial governments, the FEATM, the LNHO, 
and the IHB, which were shaping regional and global health norms in this 
period?  
The Context of Heiser’s Travels of 1925–26 
Heiser’s mid-1920s travel diary recorded his activities over the course of almost 
nine months, beginning on September 17, 1925 and ending on June 6, 1926. 
Departing from San Francisco, he visited Hawaii (Hawai’i), Japan, Manchuria 
(Northeast China), China, the Philippines, Borneo, the Straits Settlements, Java 
(the Dutch East Indies), the Federated Malay States, Siam (Thailand), Ceylon, 
India, Egypt and Palestine.27 
 
These years were pivotal in the development of regional and international health 
governing schemes. The LNHO (and the International Sanitary Convention, 
which was administered by the LNHO’s rival organization, the Office 
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international d’hygiene publique in Paris, 1907–46, hereafter called the Paris 
Office) adopted one of the governing agendas of the FEATM, the standardization 
of quarantine practice in the region.28 The FEATM had been pushing this agenda 
in the conferences in Hong Kong, 1912, Saigon, 1913, Batavia (present-day 
Jakarta), 1921, and Singapore, 1923. After the revision of the convention in 1912, 
the issue became even more important for the governments in Asia.  
 
FEATM members argued that the International Sanitary Convention of 1912 
needed to be modified in order to be applied to Asia. This was because the 
convention thus far had been concerned mainly with preventing epidemic 
diseases from coming to Europe, especially the diseases brought by the migrants 
from Asia. The Pan American Sanitary Bureau (founded in Washington, DC in 
1902) had been criticizing such European provincialism and arguing for 
modifying the convention to make it applicable to the Americas. The FEATM 
joined this call.  
 
As Alison Bashford and Anne Sealey have stressed, the push to de-provicialize the 
International Sanitary Convention was a process of turning it into a global 
convention. 29  In the 1920s, the LNHO (established in 1921) became a key 
facilitator for this globalization process. The LNHO, which had its own global 
ambitions, sent an officer, Norman White, to conduct an inquiry on quarantine 
conditions in Asia in 1922–23. His report, together with a report by the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau, became the two reference points in 1923–26 for 
discussions about revising the International Sanitary Convention in 1926. The 
LNHO, however, facilitated, rather than initiated, this change. Its leaders were 
experts from the FEATM and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau. In his report to 
the LNHO, White adopted a key point of the FEATM’s regional public health 
agenda, the standardization of the quarantine practices in Asia.30  
 
White’s report made two proposals: revising the International Sanitary 
Convention and establishing a regional center for epidemiological intelligence (a 
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center for gathering and disseminating information about epidemic cases in the 
ports and on the travelling ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans). The LNHO 
took up the second proposal, establishing the Eastern Bureau in Singapore in 
1925.31 It was the first League office outside of Europe, and the first in Asia. The 
Eastern Bureau became a symbol of the League’s global relevance. 32  The 
Rockefeller Foundation’s IHB became the bureau’s principal financial backer. 
 
Heiser, meanwhile, was involved in the FEATM’s other regional health initiative, 
the one that the LNHO did not take up: Heiser’s own proposal for an 
intergovernmental joint action for anti-beriberi measures. Heiser’s initial plan, in 
1910, was to enact an intergovernmental action to ban white rice at public 
institutions in participating countries and colonies, just as he had done in Manila. 
Soon, however, he realized that many of his peers of colonial public health 
experts at the FEATM regarded the measurement as overly interventionist, and 
did not support it. Yet, as a representative from the Philippines, Heiser continued 
to propose Asia-wide alternative measurements for beriberi control at the 
FEATM conferences in 1912, 1913, and 1921. These proposals were: to classify rice 
that contained more than a minimum level of P2O5; to implement a higher tax for 
over-milled rice; and to educate the public about the danger of regular eating of 
white rice.33  The opposition to governmental regulations, however, remained 
strong, not only among the Japanese experts—who had been briefed and 
instructed by their government to oppose governmental actions on this issue 
since 1910—but also among experts from the other rice-eating and exporting 
colonies in Southeast Asia.34 They were concerned with possible popular outrage 
or damage to colonies’ commercial interests. In 1923, the first two of these 
proposals were defeated at an intergovernmental meeting, which was held as a 
part of the FEATM’s fifth conference in Singapore.35  
 
When Heiser reached Tokyo to attend the sixth FEATM conference in 1925, 
therefore, he knew that his proposals had failed, and the FEATM shifted its focus 
to broader anti-beriberi education. After 1923, the Japanese government and its 
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health experts took a leading role at the FEATM to monitor how each government 
was implementing this educational scheme. One can speculate that this desperate 
need to provide alternative measures to banning or taxing white rice propelled 
Japanese experts’ research on nutrition, especially vitamins, a field in which they 
would achieve global prominence.36 Their rejection of the most obvious cause of 
beriberi and the failure to implement governmental measures, however, 
perpetuated Japanese suffering. As Hoi-eum Kim and Alexander Bay point out, 
academic rivalry and snobbery further obstructed beriberi prevention and 
treatment measures until mid-1925.37 
 
Heiser’s travels in Asia in 1925–26 thus took place in the context of several major 
developments in public health in Asia: a major discussion on the revision of the 
International Sanitary Convention in Paris and Geneva; the establishment of the 
LNHO’s Eastern Bureau in Singapore and the first meeting of its Advisory 
Council in Singapore; the FEATM’s sixth conference in Tokyo in 1925. 
An International Health Official with the 
Heart of a Colonial Administrator 
Heiser directed the Eastern section of the IHB from 1915 to 1934, while he 
remained a colonial administrator at heart. This was clear in his philosophy of, 
and approach to, the international health projects in Asia and the Pacific, which 
he oversaw for the IHB. The fact that he became a competent international health 
officer, I argue, illuminates the very nature of how the international health 
operations of not only the IHB, but also the FEATM and the LNHO, worked in 
this region in the League of Nations era. 
 
It was in Heiser’s effectiveness as a colonial public health administrator that Rose 
saw his potential as an officer for the IHB in Asia and the Pacific. Farley 
characterizes Heiser as “a passionate advocate of the white man’s burden.” In 
1914, Heiser was ready to move on from the Philippines because “he no longer 
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wished to spend his time ‘watching and defeating personal political schemes.’”38 
Heiser’s diary of 1925–26 shows his strong preference for US rule to local self-
rule: the US colonial administration would better serve the welfare of the 
colonized, and local politics was corrupt. 39  Examining IHB programs in the 
Philippines under Heiser, Anderson argues that they were Heiser’s “recolonizing” 
projects.40 
 
This picture of Heiser finds confirmation from people who worked under him at 
the IHB, such as John B. Grant. Grant was called Rockefeller’s “medical 
Bolshevik.” He believed in the capacity of the Chinese people, and believed that 
“good health rested on an equitable social and economic system.”41 Several factors 
contributed to shaping Grant’s worldview. Born in China to Canadian 
missionaries, and able to speak the language, Grant identified closely with the 
Chinese. When he became a Rockefeller IHB officer, he worked in state programs 
supporting community health agencies in North Carolina, which made him 
committed to the integration of curative and preventive medicine. Grant then 
worked on a brief project in China in 1917, and in 1920 studied at the new Johns 
Hopkins School of Public Health. He was deeply influenced there by Arthur 
Newsholme, who was instrumental in establishing the British Ministry of Health 
in 1919, and who emphasized the importance of state responsibility for the 
medical care of the public.42 In 1921, Grant was sent to Beijing to be in charge of 
public health courses at Peking Union Medical College (PUMC), which the IHB 
funded. He remained in China until he became director of the All-India Institute 
of Hygiene in Calcutta in 1938.  
 
Grant’s sympathy lay with the Chinese nationalists, and he sought to use his 
public health work to assist China to reclaim its national sovereignty and 
legitimacy as a modern and civilized nation. Grant worked with key LNHO 
officers, including Ludwik Rajchman (Medical Director of the LNHO, 1922–39), 
Andrija Štampar (Yugoslavian medical doctor and public health administrator 
who was associated with the IHB in 1932 and worked for the LNHO in China in 
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1932–33), as well as his immediate boss at the PUMC, Roger Greene. Grant 
helped China’s Nationalist government establish its modern public health 
administration by training Chinese medical and public health experts at the 
PUMC and other institutions, and by proposing a comprehensive blueprint for a 
public health administration infrastructure and assisting its implementation.43 
 
There was, therefore, a major ideological difference between Grant and Heiser. 
Grant worked under Heiser and travelled parts of Asia with him in in 1925–26. 
Heiser evaluated Grant highly, describing him as “real treasure with his rapid 
typewriting and intelligent cooperation in the many irons I had in the fire in 
Tokyo.” He was impressed by Grant’s ability to “win the confidence of Orientals,” 
which helped the IHB’s work.44  
 
In contrast, Grant remained ambivalent, if not blatantly critical, of his boss. In an 
interview in his later years, Grant told that Heiser must have recommended him 
to Rose for a job at the IHB. Grant nonetheless described Heiser as “probably the 
most-self-centred man I ever ran into…”, while he also understood why the IHB 
valued Heiser: Heiser’s success as Director of Health in the Philippines was well 
acknowledged; he was “the first man in the IHB who had previous experience in 
international health;” and the IHB “depended a great deal upon his 
recommendation as to the setting up of the staff who would be working abroad.”45 
 
In Grant’s view, however, Heiser “did not contribute to the development of the 
[IHB] program himself,”46 and this was Heiser’s “asset” and “liability”. It meant 
that Heiser was not innovative or initiated many important programs, but he was 
an effective administrator of the already placed projects on three accounts. First, 
while Grant was critical of Heiser’s two extensive travels to the ‘east’ in three 
years, Heiser preached the partner governments as well as his field officers “not 
to waste a single cent” of the Rockefeller fund. Second, Heiser took seriously a 
responsibility of junior IHB field staff in Asia (and the Pacific), and made sure 
that a junior staff had “a sound project” and was “capable of undertaking the 
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program”.47 Third, Heiser liked to being associated himself with high officials, 
formed a friendly relations with the wealthy and the prominent, and gained 
genuine respects from this circle. He had a polished manner to be charming in 
this circle.48 
 
Despite his big ego, vanity, and colonial paternalism, however, Heiser still 
supported IHB projects in Asia and the Pacific, which contributed to the 
development of local expertise. As James Gillespie argues, Heiser saw merit in a 
project developed by an IHB officer in the western Pacific, Sylvester Lambert, to 
cultivate local public health administrators at the Central Medical College at 
Suva. Heiser backed him, at least until the late 1920s, against increasing 
opposition from Frederick Russell, who replaced Rose in 1923 as IHB Director.49 
Farley argues that Heiser’s emphasis on public health infrastructure clashed with 
Russell’s approach. Both Russell (1923–35) and his successor, Wilbur Sawyer 
(1935–44), prioritized the IHB’s role in cutting-edge laboratory medical research. 
Russell also found Heiser “difficult to deal with,” and “impossible to command.” 
Farley speculates that this led Russell to fire Heiser in 1934.50 
 
Heiser’s support for a local empowerment project in the Dutch East Indies had an 
impact on independence movements in the following years. As Terence Hull 
argues, Heiser supported John L. Hydrick’s experimental IHB scheme to 
incentivize local peoples to learn about disease prevention measures as well as 
the training of local public health experts in a rural area in the Dutch East 
Indies. 51  Hull contrasts this IHB approach with the Dutch government’s 
authoritarian public health policies and law enforcement style. This was certainly 
how Heiser portrayed the Dutch colonial administration in his diary of 1925–26, 
in which he contrasted Dutch authoritarianism with the IHB’s (and his) more 
democratic and grassroots approach. He recorded that he visited Hydrick’s 
experimental village in January 1926, and noted that he smoothed over 
difficulties between Hydrick and the local colonial authorities.52 He contrasted 
Hydrick’s IHB project with the more heavy-handed Dutch colonial policy toward 
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hookworm. For Heiser, the Hydrick project was a test case of “the IHB’s 
methods.” Heiser’s dislike of the Dutch colonial officialdom was clear throughout 
the diary, and he may have presented himself as more “liberal” than he was.53  
 
Still, the project Hydrick implemented in the rural Dutch East Indies in 1924–39, 
and which Heiser supported (until he left the IHB in 1934), not only contributed 
to the improvement of the health of the villagers, but also assisted their 
independence movement. Eric Stein argues that this IHB project, which began 
first as an anti-hookworm campaign—and then broadened its scope to other 
areas, including malaria prevention—encouraged local self-autonomy. Hydrick’s 
ideas and institutions, Stein continues, became the basis for grass-root 
nationalist movements among the local doctors whom Hydrick had trained. In 
Stein’s view, the scheme’s legacy lasted long after Hydrick departed the colony in 
1939.54  
 
While Heiser had little time for corrupt local elites in colonial Asia, he believed it 
was vital to educate the locals, and the locals had to take initiatives in improving 
public health standards. What distinguished Heiser from John Grant, however, 
was that Heiser saw these grassroots approaches as a means not for local 
empowerment movements that would lead to their political autonomy, but for 
good colonial management. Heiser was impressed by Hydrick’s scheme because it 
found great support among the locals, who, as a result, were taking voluntary 
actions to establish latrines without police enforcement. Heiser further noted that 
Hydrick’s scheme was rapidly winning over not only the locals, but also 
government officials.55 Heiser was keen to tell of Hydrick’s successful experiment 
to his peers in the region in Singapore and Siam, while making no reference to 
self-rule or political autonomy.56 
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Heiser as a Medium for the Transfer of 
Colonial Health Management Ideas  
Heiser’s diary of 1925–26 further gives us several useful insights on the 
relationship among the colonial administrations, the IHB, the LNHO and the 
FEATM. To be sure, one needs to be cautious in using a diary of a person with a 
big ego. One also needs to be mindful of using a diary that was not only a record 
of what he did and thought, but also a demonstration of the importance of the 
actions of its author, and the justification of the time and money the author spent 
or authorized others to spend.  
 
Despite the obvious self-serving importance and ego of the man, the diary 
nonetheless reveals Heiser’s skillful dealings with colonial officials, experts, and 
the local peoples. He worked extremely hard and, while enjoying privileged 
interactions with high officials, he also went everywhere he needed or wanted, 
with at times harsh travelling and lodging conditions. He was driven by a sense of 
mission and adventure.  
American Experts’ Leadership in Initiating a 
Regional Public Health Agenda 
Heiser’s diary reveals the nature of the operation of international health projects 
of not only the IHB, which used a more vertical (country-specific) approach, but 
also the FEATM and the LNHO, both of which aimed for a collaborative 
approach. Such cooperation in Asia in the 1920s is best characterized as 
intercolonial, as opposed to international.57  
 
As an IHB officer, Heiser emerged as a pivotal point in this intercolonial transfer 
of the knowledge of public health administrations and measures in Asia. The 
diary illuminates how the network of colonial public health executives and 
experts in Asia worked, what roles American experts in the field played in Asia, 
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and what was the nature of the LNHO’s work, as Heiser saw them. Heiser became 
a forerunner of American experts who led region-wide multilateral cooperation 
through informal expert networks in diverse fields in pan-Pacific organizations.58 
These experts and organizations initiated regional governing agendas in the 
period, which was often regarded as American isolationism (especially in its 
relations with the League of Nations). 
 
In the 1920s, as director of a prestigious and wealthy American foundation’s 
public health work in Asia, Heiser knew that he and other American public health 
experts would lead their peers in the region, with region-wide governing visions 
and programs. In his 1925–26 diary, Heiser stressed the superiority of US public 
health education and its public health policies to those of other models, and 
suggested that American-trained medical doctors and public health experts 
should lead public health administrations in Asia.59 He often compared the US 
approach to the Dutch model in Dutch East Indies. He described Dutch 
treatment of plague, for example, as a “fireman”-style public health policy. It was 
neither “preventive nor systematic,” but attended crises when they occurred on 
an ad hoc basis.60  
Influence through Governmental Channels 
and Contributing to Government Policies 
Heiser’s and the IHB’s work in Asia and the Pacific distinguished itself from 
those of the other pan-Pacific organizations of the 1920s by its strong 
government-centered approach. Although the IHB was a non-governmental 
organization, it worked with imperial (Japanese), national (Siam and China), and 
colonial administrations in the region. The IHB, a “non-governmental” 
organization, therefore, did not work against the state for the people or what we 
now call the “civil society.” Rather, it worked with governments, assisting 
governmental schemes and policies. 61  Heiser held to this principle firmly, 
repeatedly reiterating it in his travels to those who wished to apply for the IHB’s 
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schemes, including its fellowships: the IHB only worked with governments, and a 
candidate for the IHB fellowship had to have a strong government 
recommendation and be assured to have a substantial position in the 
administration upon that candidate’s return.62  
 
Although the IHB officially attached no strings to its funding, it was inevitable 
that the organization would have a certain influence on the relevant governments 
and their projects that the IHB supported. Heiser’s status as Director for the East 
gave him clout, and the fact that he had great discretion to authorize IHB funding 
added to his power. His influence nonetheless stemmed also from his 
achievements as a colonial administrator, his expert knowledge in public health, 
and way he could interact with relevant officials with a sense of authority.  
 
The diary clearly shows that Heiser’s status as a former colonial official was a 
crucial basis for IHB operations in Asia and the Pacific. It opened a channel for 
him to meet relevant high officials in the other colonies in the region. During his 
travel in Asia in 1925–26, he was often invited to formal and informal functions, 
which provided great opportunities for him to meet governors and public health 
directors at the central and local colonial administrations. He mingled with them, 
and in informal chats or over meals or coffee he was often asked advice on their 
public health policies or what was going on in a particular area of public health at 
metropolitan centers. Heiser made sure he wrote in his diary that these high 
officials sought his advice, that he gave good advice, and that he was happy with 
the influence he could have on their policies. 
 
While some colonial officials were annoyed by the IHB’s intervention in their 
territory, most were aware of their lack of resources and were happy for the 
organization’s assistance. Dr. Albert L. Hoops, who was an executive of the 
council of the FEATM at the Straits Settlements, for example, praised IHB’s work 
in British colonies and thanked Heiser’s decision (on behalf of the IHB) to 
contribute a “million pounds endowment … in Mauritius” for the advancement of 
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health.63 The case demonstrates Heiser’s great discretion in deciding what the 
IHB could and could not fund, and communication with the New York 
headquarters seems to have been reserved for a renewal of an agreement or a new 
agreement with relevant governments.  
 
Heiser’s diary demonstrates a frequent transfer of public health ideas, 
measurements and institutions among colonial administrations. At times, Heiser 
himself was the medium of such intercolonial idea transfers through informal 
conversations at the gatherings of the officials. Examples include Borneo’s use of 
the report by the Philippine Bureau of Science on leprosy treatment, Heiser’s 
suggestion that Singapore learn from the lessons of the construction of the 
Panama Canal for the construction of its naval base, and another suggestion of 
him that India introduce Javanese vaccine production, which it did successfully 
adopt. Heiser also recommended that colonial experts in Asia observe Hydrick’s 
well-designed scheme in the Dutch East Indies, discussed earlier.64 Through the 
advice he dispensed, Heiser was reinforcing and creating webs of networks of 
experts, and helping to shape shared public health administration knowledge 
among them. 
 
This was not new in 1925–25, nor was such knowledge unanimous in any way. 
The FEATM conferences had been forming a largely intercolonial epistemic 
community of public health experts in Asia since 1910. As an early FEATM 
leader, Heiser contributed to this creation, and as the IHB’s Director for the East, 
he continued to be a hub of intercolonial idea-transfer. Given the conflicting 
views within the IHB—especially after 1923 when Russell took over its 
directorship from Rose—Heiser’s thinking did not represent the IHB’s as a whole. 
Yet he still represented some ideas of the IHB or among IHB field officers in Asia 
and the Pacific, which were also shared among colonial experts in the region. 
These ideas included an emphasis on local education, the promotion of American 
training, and the training of local public health experts who could work within 
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the communities. Heiser’s views (and those of other IHB officials) became 
influential in a few other areas of government policy in Asia. 
 
There is, however, little evidence that Heiser used his IHB travel to persuade 
FEATM members to support his own agenda at FEATM conferences. This did not 
mean that Heiser stopped caring about the FEATM after 1915. On the contrary, 
he remained a keen participant, even after he had resigned from his position in 
the Philippines colonial administration. In 1925, he proudly recorded that he had 
been named the FEATM’s “advisor to the Council” at the sixth FEATM 
conference in Tokyo. He noted that the decision, which received “great applause,” 
would “now give [him] a permanent status” at the FEATM, “the same as a 
delegate representing a sovereign country” and “a continuous seat in the Council 
in future years.”65  
 
Yet, his priority in 1925 was not to push through his agenda, but to produce an 
agreement among experts who represented the relevant governments. As 
discussed earlier, Heiser had pursued an interventionist measurement of beriberi 
prevention at the FEATM since 1910. The conference of 1923 had finally decided 
not to take region-wide intergovernmental actions to regulate the distribution of 
white rice or discourage white rice eating. This must have disappointed Heiser. At 
the Tokyo conference in 1925, Heiser was nevertheless asked to chair the beriberi 
committee. While he witnessed much politicking behind the scenes, he was more 
proud that, as chairman, he had “finally succeeded in having sixteen countries 
unanimously adopt a draft of a resolution” to declare that beriberi was a 
notifiable disease, “with the exception of a temporary reservation of Japan and 
Java because they doubted their authority” to do so.66 He regarded that his duty 
as chair was “to secure an agreement and harmonize the many divergent views.”67 
Heiser here presented himself as not a man caught up with his own agenda, but 
as a pragmatic and effective negotiator whose ultimate duty was to produce an 
agreement among all participants. 
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Mentoring Young Experts, Training Local 
Nurses, and Fostering Local Initiatives 
Farley’s assessment and Grant’s impression of Heiser suggest Heiser was not only 
staunchly pro-colonial, but also a self-centered man. Yet, Grant recognized 
Heiser’s useful guidance of IHB’s junior field officers, as discussed earlier, and 
Heiser could be an effective mentor. The IHB employed young field officers who 
were sent to foreign environments, often in very difficult conditions. Heiser, and 
the IHB more generally, were aware of these difficulties. Heiser more often than 
not supported these field officers and their projects, as seen in his backing for 
Hydrick and Lambert. His 1925–26 diary also shows that he took great care of an 
IHB officer of whose capacity and character he was not even certain.68 Such care 
for the career paths of young public health practitioners was also seen in his 
discussion of a fellowship applicant.69  
 
Heiser also regarded nurse training as vital for public health services, and was 
committed to the establishment and improvement of the training of locals. This 
meant modern (Americanized) training. While Heiser paid attention to nurse 
training in other countries, his main concern was the Philippines.70 Heiser began 
modern nursing training for the locals while he was Director of Health in the 
Philippines, and noted that he had personally persuaded the first four girls to 
become nurses.71 In 1925–26, he was still closely involved in this development in 
the Philippines. There is no question of his colonialist, patronizing belief and 
manner, his gender bias, and his belief in a transformation of “naked natives” 
into Americanized, uniformed “modern nurses” with good English.72 Within these 
confines, he worked with a few leading female figures in the fields—he names a 
Miss Macaraig, superintendent of the Philippine Islands Nurse Training School, 
and a Miss Fitzgerald—in order to improve the number of nurses and their 
standard of training, while also paying attention to their recruitment after 
graduation.73  
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Heiser and the LNHO 
Heiser’s travel through Asia in 1925–26 coincided with the period when the 
LNHO established its Eastern Bureau, a regional center for epidemiological 
intelligence, in Singapore in March 1925. For the LNHO, its Medical Director 
Ludwik Rajchman, and Tsurumi Sanzo  , the Japanese member of the Health 
Committee of the League in this period, the establishment of the bureau heralded 
the League’s global reach and the rising significance of Asia. 74  Rajchman 
negotiated vital IHB funding for the LNHO’s two core activities, an international 
exchange program of public health experts and the gathering and communication 
of epidemic intelligence. He gained US$125,000 for the Eastern Bureau from the 
IHB over five years, on the condition that the bureau secure subsequent financial 
backing from interested governments after this period.75 
 
Heiser was in Singapore at the end of 1925 to visit the bureau’s impressive office: 
“It occupies the entire large floor… in a huge building facing the bay.”76 It was a 
well-organized office with many necessary charts and tables. Its first director was 
Dr. Gilbert Brook, Director of Public Health for the Straits Settlements colonial 
government. 
 
As an observer, Heiser attended the second meeting of the Advisory Council of 
the Eastern Bureau on January 4–6, 1926, along with thirteen others (ten from 
the Advisory Council member countries of British India, British North Borneo, 
China, Federated Malay States, Indo-China, Hong Kong, Japan, Dutch East 
Indies, Siam, the Straits Settlements, as well as Rajchman from the LNHO, Brook 
from the bureau, and an observer from the Philippines). 77  The three-day 
conference discussed both technical and political issues. 
 
Heiser considered the meeting fruitful, especially valuing the positive dynamics 
among the intercolonial epistemic community. Mingling with “delegates from so 
many different countries,” he wrote, “affords unusual opportunities to get in 
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touch with much information that could not be obtained otherwise, or at best 
with great difficulty.”78 In his usual manner, he noted that many delegates asked 
him for technical advice and information about the public health administrative 
procedures of various countries, and that his “valuable” contribution had been 
publicly praised.79 
 
Members felt strongly that this region needed special attention from the League 
and the International Sanitary Convention, and that the League should establish 
a regional committee to study the diseases and conditions specific to the region.80 
The feeling reflected the FEATM’s founding spirit. Members also discussed 
whether the Eastern Bureau should expand its operations beyond the Pacific 
Ocean to the Indian Ocean, including the shores of East Africa, because some 
stressed that this would be very useful for India.81 The Advisory Council accepted 
the suggestion.  
 
Although Heiser appreciated this meeting, he remained unsure about the 
influence of the LNHO in Asia, for several reasons. First, Heiser detected a strong 
skepticism towards the League in general among the experts present at the 
FEATM’s 1925 Tokyo conference, while he found others were indifferet.82 At the 
Strait Settlements government, where the League’s Eastern Bureau was located, 
Heiser observed that officials were not enthusiastic or were ignorant about the 
LNHO. [Hugh] Fraser, whom Heiser described as a “Colonial Secretary” (its 
formal title was Chief Secretary, the Straits Settlement), and who “often acted as 
Governor General”, even found it ridiculous to send a weekly epidemiological 
report to the Eastern Bureau. They were also not sure what the LNHO did, and 
Heiser found himself doing a PR job for the organization, explaining its functions 
to government officials in Singapore.83 The second problem was that the LNHO’s 
Medical Director, Rajchman, was not popular. Heiser recorded that Dr. Van 
Lonkhuijzen, the Advisory Council member from the Dutch East Indies, 
“intensely disliked” Rajchman, and told Heiser that the majority of the Council’s 
delegates felt likewise.84 
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A third obstacle to the LNHO’s influence was that Heiser held a low opinion of 
the competence of Brook, Straits Settlements Director of Public Health, and now 
Director of the Eastern Bureau. Heiser was not alone. When Brook led an 
inspection tour of the quarantine station at the Singapore port, Heiser and 
Rajchman were shocked by its appalling condition.85 Dr. Hoops, the FEATM’s 
executive and the Eastern Bureau’s Advisory Council member from the Straits 
Settlements, confided with Heiser that Brook had been a major cause of the 
inefficiency of the medical school and the port health office in the colony, as well 
as the League of Nations in the region.86 Heiser and Rajchman agreed that Brook 
was old and inefficient, and that the Eastern Bureau needed a new, energetic 
talent.87 For Heiser, the League’s functions were generally a bore, following old 
and rigid diplomatic protocols and permitting few stimulating discussions, which 
probably reflected Brook’s old-fashioned style. Heiser indicated that he preferred 
a more relaxed, casual American-style of gathering.88 
 
Heiser also felt an urgent need to strengthen the Straits Settlements’ hygiene 
service, and was deeply disappointed by Brook’s lack of interest in hygiene 
training (especially of local doctors) at the new medical school in Singapore. In 
Heiser’s view, the school could be the center for training colonial public health 
officers in the region. Instead, there was no prospect for funding. Heiser noted 
his determination to establish good hygiene education in Singapore and Hong 
Kong.89 Had Rose remained head of the IHB, he may have had a chance to pursue 
this plan.  
 
Heiser’s fourth concern about the LNHO was that, in addition to the lack of 
support or understanding from the Straits Settlement and its inefficient director, 
the LNHO had a hard time being recognized as a novel intergovernmental 
organization. The problem affected the LNHO’s ability to communicate—the core 
function of the its Eastern Bureau—when it failed to get a discounted government 
rate for sending and receiving telegrams. This was because telegraph companies 
did not recognize the LNHO as a government organization, and even the 
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Telegraphic Conference in Paris declined to consider the League an official 
body.90 Heiser was incredulous: it seemed “absurd each individual country can 
obtain low government rates, but they are denied when requested for a group.”91 
This was League executives’ failure to promote the organization’s public image 
and to persuade the outside world of its important functions. As a result, the 
Eastern Bureau faced an increased running cost. Alarmed, Rajchman discussed 
the matter with Heiser in January 1926. Heiser suggested a solution: the Straits 
Settlement government send telegrams on behalf of the bureau, to be reimbursed 
by the League; and the bureau use more wireless services.92 
Heiser and Rajchman 
Despite all these concerns, Heiser was a supporter of the LNHO, especially its 
activities in Asia and the Pacific. He also wanted a greater initiative from Asia at 
the LNHO, which Rajchman supported. 93  Heiser, however, was mindful of 
Rajchman’s critics, who were not in a minority. Heiser himself acknowledged that 
Rajchman had engaged in “manipulative” tactics related to the appointment of 
Eastern Bureau vice-presidents at its January 1926 Advisory Council meeting. 
The council was dominated by the representatives of British colonies, and 
Rajchman tried to block British colonial representation among the four vice-
president posts. This had left hard feelings among the members, Heiser noted.94  
Heiser then came to the rescue, he recorded, bringing harmony by redrafting the 
resolution to define the powers of the vice-president by including representatives 
of China, Indochina, Siam, and the Dutch East Indies (to add to Japan) with the 
president (India) of the council as ex-officio chairman, and by eliminating the 
executive committee feature. He noted that this brought “great satisfaction on 
both sides,” including Rajchman.95  
 
The experience made Heiser cautious that the IHB not be dragged into 
Rajchman’s ambitious and costly projects. This included the project of 
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international plague control. As Grant indicated earlier, Heiser made sure the 
best use of the fund with maximum results.96 
 
At the close of the Advisory Council meeting in Singapore, Heiser stressed that he 
attended as a courtesy to the former fellow health administrators in this part of 
the world, not as the IHB’s representative. The IHB would not exercise a 
supervising power, he continued, and had confidence in the LNHO.97  
Colonial Management and Economic 
Development 
Despite this distancing posture, Heiser’s approach to public health was similar to 
a growing tendency at the LNHO under Rajchman. Heiser believed that economic 
development was vital for the improvement of public health conditions in Asia. 
The idea was close to the broader rural reconstruction approach that became 
prominent at the LNHO after the late 1920s. Because of this, Heiser was critical 
of an earlier report by the LNHO’s Malaria Commission, which stressed the use of 
quinine. Heiser believed, instead, that broader educational and economic 
measures offered the most vital anti-malaria strategy.  
 
Heiser’s position in this regard was evident in his support for Hydrick’s IHB work 
in the Dutch East Indies. It also explains why Heiser had introduced goats to 
rural Philippines, proposing to allocate a goat to every family. In his view, this 
would provide villagers with milk and meat for their nutrition as well as saleable 
skins to improve their economic conditions.98 We now know the introduction of 
goats to the region caused major environmental problems. Its economic benefits 
have nonetheless been acknowledged, while solutions to the environmental 
effects are being sought.99 The LNHO would soon promote similarly broader 
rural reconstruction agendas at its rural hygiene conferences, first in Geneva in 
1931, and then in Bandung in 1937 (the Far Eastern Rural Hygiene Conference). 
Although Heiser had left the IHB by then, the conference of 1937 could be 
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understood as a joint venture of the LNHO, the FEATM, and the IHB. It is worth 
noting that Heiser’s initial FEATM agenda for addressing the danger of white rice 
consumption for beriberi prevention was reinstated at this rural hygiene 
conference.100  
 
Heiser never lost sight of economic development in his approach to public health. 
In his 1938 autobiography he affirmed his belief that “health should be regarded 
from the economic as well as from the humanitarian viewpoint.”101 We saw this 
belief already in his anti-beriberi measures in the colonial Philippines in 1910. He 
also shaped his colonial public health policies within the framework of the 
economic management of the colony. He was well informed about the region’s 
economy, including such factors as labor costs and the impacts of industrial 
actions and independence movements on colonial economies, as well as 
resources, production, and levels of trade. Public health policies, Heiser was 
convinced, needed to take such issues into account.102 Finally, while strongly 
believing in good public health infrastructures and the education of the locals for 
that purpose, he always looked for the cheapest way to maximize results. He 
would not support a project if the cost was beyond the capacity of the relevant 
administration.103 
Conclusion 
Heiser was a forerunner of American experts who pioneered multilateral and 
cooperative efforts to shape a region-wide policy agenda. He did so first as a 
colonial administrator in the Philippines, by initiating the formation of the 
FEATM and pushing for region-wide intergovernmental anti-beriberi actions in 
1908–14. He continued to play this role after 1915 as the IHB’s Director for the 
East on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation. His prior career as a competent 
colonial administrator was the basis for the IHB’s work on international health 
projects in Asia and the Pacific. He approached them as a colonial administrator, 
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and guided IHB operations to contribute to the management of colonized peoples 
and colonial economic development.  
 
His travel diary of 1925–26, which occurred at a critical historical moment for 
defining regional and global public health management schemes, however, 
demonstrates that while international health projects in the region were based on 
the structure of the existing imperial polities, there were a great deal of 
cooperative actions among the imperial polities and their colonial experts in the 
region. These actions included transfers of the ideas of colonial health 
management from one colony to another through expert and official colonial 
networks, and Heiser and his IHB field officers were a crucial part of those 
networks. Within the colonial limitations, Heiser believed that the development 
of local public health experts, including nurses, was vital for the improvement of 
health conditions in the region. He also believed in grassroots education 
programs that stressed “voluntary” action by the public to do the right things for 
their own health management. Heiser was undoubtedly a passionate guardian of 
colonial rule, and many of his initiatives contributed to greater state control over 
colonized peoples. Unbeknownst to him, however, some of the public health 
schemes he shepherded would ultimately serve as organizing platforms for 
independence movements. 
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